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Abstract 
How do nations choose which events to memorialize? Jn a study of the collective mnemonics of 
the United States' wars in Vietnam and Korea, 1 argue that the latter has been disproportionately 
discounted given its long-lasting and timely impacts. Using concepts such as semiotics, 
"dominant voices", and habitus, r argue that the intense memorialization of the Vietnam War has 
been sustained through resources not put towards the Korean War. I argue that sentimentality 
guides us to continue strengthening Vietnam War mnemonic devices and, in turn, leads us to 
further indoctrinate Vietnam as an unforgettable war while further relegating the Korean War to 
the status of ''forgotten." 
Key Words: Vietnam, Korea, Mnemonics, Collective Memory, habitus, semiotics, war memory, 
media studies 
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..--------·------ ·-·----------
Foreword 
My grandfather's tour (d"duty in the Air Force during World War II, The War in Korea, 
and the War in Vietnam provided a constant reminder ofthe legacy of these conflicts. I have now 
studied abroad in stabilized Vietnam, from where my middle-aged grandfather once flew the 
bodies o.ffallen US. soldiers back to the home .front. I have also studied in a stabilized Germany, 
miles away.fi-om the site where my grandfather once served as a prisoner of war. In the 1950s, 
he served for the Korean conflict from London. We don't know quite what he did, but !found 
myse!falways forgetting this tour of duty. The war seemed inconsequential. The North Korea I 
read about in the news, the 28,500 troops stationed in South Korea never struck me as connected 
to a controversial war. I didn't remember talking about it much in school. A lternatively, I was 
drawn to accounts ofthe social unrest during the Vietnam War era, the protests, the burned draft 
cards, LBJ evading responsibility . The more I thought about it~ the more difficult it was to 
understand how a nation that spent decades trying to convince the ·world of the dangers of 
Communism could avoid talking at length about the war in Korea. Moreover, if the United States 
had a hand in creating the nation that seeks to pose an existential threat to our own, why was 
there still a greater emphasis on the war in Vietnam? 
Preface: Memory as an Interdisciplinary Concept 
Discuss ions of cultural memory from an anthropological perspecti ve quickly turn 
interd isciplinary; upon attempting to define cultural memory, one is faced with the task of 
distinguishing it psychologically from individual memory, the nature of which is already heav il y 
debated. No sooner can one theorize how the se lf relates to a group than one inev itably 
approaches timeless philosophical questions about the creation of the se lf and its relationship to 
society. One can try to piece together the story of a nation· s past, but one wi 11 quickly encounter 
the supposedly objective history of a nation and the education and art it uses to teach and 
interpret its past. This is one of the reasons I was drawn to thi s topic, why I found it suitable to 
culminate my study of anthropology. I have always been an interdi sc iplinary learner. What 
originally drew me to anthropology was the question ofthe relationship of the individual to the 
group, of the phi losophical presumption that humans and groups and their notions of the world 
are worthy of study, and that our group identities mold our individual identities . Therefore, 
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though this project wi ll commence from a theoretical basis of soc iology and anthropo logy, I wi ll 
also pull from the disciplines of philosophy, history, and media studies . 
Introduction 
ln this work, I wi ll argue that the Korean War is underrepresented in American War 
Mnemonics, and that it deserves greater attention and analysis. I will also argue that proliferation 
of interest in the Vietnam War stems more fro m a basis of guilt, sentimentality, semiotics, and 
the quantity of baby boomers than it does last ing political s ignificance. 
I w ill argue these points using theories of remembering and forgetting, sem iotics, and 
Pierre Bordieu's habitus. While many works on similar topics start from Maurice Halbwachs' 
The Collective Memory, I empathize with scholars who see logical fl aws with this theory and 
accredit its recent popularity to the academic "memory boom" of the last few decades. After 
establishing a theoretical basis, I will contextualize and compare the s imilarities, differences, 
memorialization , and political legacies of each conflict. I suggest that the reasons that the 
Vietnam War is memoria lized more than the Korean War are that the American habitus of war 
mnemonics makes it so that the Vietnam War continues to "fit in" better with American history. 
This habitus is created through having more adequate language for the Vietnam War than the 
Korean War, hav ing better imagery and memori als (semiotics) for the Vietnam War, feeling less 
gui lt about the standard of li ving in Vietnam than that of North Korea, and "dominant voices" 
transmitting the correct rules for remembering the wars (Lomsky-Feder 2005). Our support and 
continued use of these semiotics, guided by sentimentality more than criti ca l thinking, further 
engra ins them in ou r habitus. Ultimately, 1 will suggest that particularly in an era when North 
Korea poses such a threat to the safety of the world, it wou ld be w ise to consider alternative 
methodologies to establi shing and studying hi story. 
4 
Part 1: Literature Review and Theoretical Framework 
Maurice Ha lbwachs: The Father of Co ll ective Memory 
To speak about "col lective memory" in any discipline, it has become standard to 
reference Maurice Halbwachs. A French thinker, be coined the term ·'col lective memory'' in his 
1950 work La Memoh-e collective. The concept is multifaceted, but Halbwachs ' own intel lectual 
hi story prov ides some insight into its genes is. Ea rli er in hi s career, Halbwachs studied 
philosophy, draw ing infl uence from philosopher Henri Bergson. Bergson instill ed in Halbwachs 
an orientation towards an intuitive and subjective perception of "inner time" and the notion that 
knowledge of this inner time as expressed through memory and other processes led to a deeper 
knowledge of the self. From this spirit arose lla lbwachs' creativity, spontaneity and a sense that 
intuition could produce greater insights than those poss ible with sc ience and reason alone. In 
1905, Halbwachs shifted hi s study to soc iology, becoming a student of Emi le Durkheim. The 
sh ift enriched Halbwachs ' work with an appreciat ion of quantitat ive measurement and an interest 
in the soc ial body as a whole, while his curios ity on deep human questions endured. 
Tt is important to first establ ish Ha lbwachs' pervas ive theories on memory. a major focus 
of hi s career. Halbwachs had questions about the way people and insti tutions construct and 
maintain hi stori es, curios iti es he capita lized upon in hi s service as a Durkheimian hi storica l critic 
(Coser 1992). Durkheim and hi s students tend to emphas ize the power of the soc iety over the 
individual. In Durkheim's Sociologie et Philosophie, the author outlines some tenants of 
·'collective representation" whose qualities seem to be reflected in Halbwachs' own philosophy, 
such as the definiti on of co llective representation as a conceptual framework fo r act ion prov ided 
by soc ial systems (1953, 17). For Halbwachs, co ll ective hi story is both soc iall y constructed and 
soc ially sustained. In fact, the creat ion of memories is almost an entirely soc ial activity . In his 
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view, humans' understanding of"the past is a social construction mainly, if not wholly, shaped 
by the concerns of the present" (Coser 1992, 25). This notion emphasizes the position of the 
rememberer in the present as influential to the process and content of memory. While I will later 
present some challenges to points in Halbwachs' logic, this specific idea is one that many 
scholars of memory assert. Halbwachs' theory diminishes the capacity of the individual to have a 
private and subj ective vers ion of a memory. To him, our memories are totally shaped by the 
communication we have with others in the social world ; "one cannot in fact think about the 
events of one's past without discoursing upon them. But to discourse upon something means to 
connect within a single system of ideas our opinions as well as those of our circle" (Halbwachs 
1992, 53). While thi s concept may seem refutable, it is important to reserve criticism at this 
moment, as understanding Halbwachs' logic is key to understanding the arguments of many 
scholars on memory. 
The final key elements of Halbwachs ' theory regard ·'individual"memories. In 
Halbwachs words, "the memory of the group manifests itself in individual memories" 
(Halbwachs 1992, 40). Exemplars of one c lass of collective memory, cultural memories are 
based around "fateful events of the past" whose memory is sustained through cultural formation 
(texts, rites, monuments) and institutional communication (recitation practice, observance). This 
view is in line with recent research publi shed in the Annual Review o.f Anthropology regarding 
semiotics as an effective means to study collective memory (French 2012). I will return to this 
concept later. The memories that end up critical a nation's mnemonic (I will use this word to 
sign(fy those events o.fwhich citizens remind one another), the memories that are sustained in the 
collective repertoire may be chosen in a largely intuitive, "family-like" manner, commemorating 
not simply those events that have the largest quantifiable impact, but often those with the most 
6 
sentimental connotations. To foreshadow a bit, the idea of theoretical ly reifying a nation so that 
th is collective body can "choose" anything will become a key conceptual challenge to 
Halbwachs. 
Though thi s work ofHalbwachs was largely disregarded until the I 970s, it now holds a 
prized status in the memory discourse. Attaining this status can be partially attributed to the 
academic era since the I 980s that scholars across disciplines have deemed ·'the memory boom." 
The Memory Boom 
In situating thi s analysis within the anthropo logical and sociologica l li terature on 
coll ective memory, it is important to expand on this widespread trend within scholarsh ip: the 
"memory boom." Th is term refers to an exp losion of research and writing on fonns of memory 
and a focus on nai ling down the elusive concept. Niche academic foci have ari sen in subfields 
like media and memory studies that aim to shed light on the relationship humans have with the 
past. The postmodernist turn of many academics and disciplines, too, has encouraged a rejection 
of accepted hi storical facts and an orientation towards li ved hi stories and personal accounts 
(Blight 2009). Numerous anthropologists and sociologists have incorporated the attractive and 
mysterious concept of memory into their work, questioning how memory interplays with cul tural 
identity formation . Historian Pierre Nora posits a few explanations for what he calls ··the current 
upsurge in memory". The first is that the notion of the '·acceleration of hi story" in a world where 
change is increasingly among the only constants, causes people to begin "stockpiling" those 
histories and lessons of the past and present that may at any moment be taken from us. 
Additionally, by defining the past as hi story, we distance ourselves from the past and create 
perceptions that we have done suffi cient reflecting upon the past. Lastly, the expans ion of the 
concept of ·'identity'' from the individual to the group has encouraged us to delve deeper into the 
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cultures and group histories that are now said to define us (Nora 1989, 439-441). 
This boom has been a boon and a bane. On one hand, the sheer volume of research 
regarding memory bodes well for those interested in the concept. At the same time, the number 
of voices renders the entire field in danger of unrecoverable vagueness. Critics of the memory 
boom ask an important question that harkens back to Halbwachs ' analysis: when do definitions 
of memory become synonymous with those of culture, of history, of literature? 
Cha llenges to Anthropological Approaches to Memory 
In response to the memory boom, anthropo logist David Berl iner reflected upon the 
memory work of anthropo logists, crit iquing some ways the concept of memory is employed. 
Berliner's main issue with definitions of"memory" is a Jack of precision, noting the risk of 
conflating "memory" and "culture." In his work Commemorations: The Politics of National 
Identity, John R. Gillis warned that "memory seems to be losing precise meaning in proportion to 
its growing rhetorical power" ( 1994, 3 ). Berliner's work tracks the "genealogy" of the memory 
boom in anthropology, a much needed study to accompany those dissecting the memory boom in 
other disciplines in the humanities. Notes Berliner (2005, 200), 
recent anthropological studies have indeed abandoned the suspicious att itude toward memory 
that previously characterized many hi stories ... for a more phenomenological approach, which 
consists of capturing the way people perceive: they remember, forget and reinterpret their own 
pasts. This focus on history as it is lived, on the remembrances shared and transmitted by social 
groups has shown that people experi ence and interp ret their pasts fi·om a multiplicity of 
viewpoints. Such a perspective, which documents the existence of multiple and sometimes 
antagonistic visions of the past within the same society, has been copiously developed in 
anthropological stud ies since the 1980s. 
Jndeed, this analysis can be applied to any anthropological project seeking to uncover "local" 
histories, perhaps too to those works that challenge supposed ly objective shared histories of 
nations or other groups. The phenomenological approach can be useful when applied specifically 
to subjective and pluralist memories, but some social sc ientists have taken to applying this 
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concept to much broader realms. The danger now is that what memory is is being divorced from 
the word itse lf. Memory is not synonymous with culture or tradition, and it has a complex 
relat ionship with history. As Berliner critiques, 
The label "memory" aims to grasp the past we carry, how we are shaped by it and how thi s past is 
transmitted. Therefore, every little trace of the "past in the present" is designated as memory ... a 
nation or a society can[ not] be said to exist, but never as a separate, distinct, single orga ni sm with 
a mind, o r a will , or a memory of its own (2005 , 199). 
While Halbwachs' influence on the group memory di sc ipline cannot be ignored, Noa Ged i and 
Yigal EJam also raise important qualms about Halbwachs' logic and the implications of his 
theory. Gedi and Elam express concern with think ing of the collective population "as some 
integral entity with a will and capacity of its own" (1996, 34). As noted previously, this type of 
critique is not an uncommon challenge for a Durkheimian thinker. Gedi and Elam also present 
reservations about Halbwachs logic. noting that "Halbwachs never reall y bothered to elaborate 
the theoretical foundation of the concept of' collective memory' to which he assigned such a 
major social function, nor did he give a clear definition of it" (1996, 35). Readers of these works 
might struggle with the logical foundation of the father of collective memory. But even if there 
existed a flawless logical shift from social consciousness and memory move from to individual 
consciousness and memory, there is more to wonder about in Halbwachs ' theory. As mentioned 
before, in Durkheimian tradition, Halbwachs negates the existence of individual memory. In 
doing so, he presents bold claims about the functions of a challenging subject in cogniti ve 
sc ience without providing any rea l psychological information. 
Interestingly enough, as The Collective Memory progresses, Halbwachs seems to soften 
considerably on his claims, noting that soc iety might not be a being capable of rememberi ng, but 
rather a framework in which memories can be interpreted or gathered. This understanding of 
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memory as a social field is in line with Jay Winter's work on collective memory (1999) and the 
theory of Pierre Bourdieu's habitus (1984). While this critical challenge complicates our 
analysis, it can help point us towards more precise terms when dealing with important events 
from our past. 
Towards More Precise Terminology 
In response to the blurriness ofHalbwachs' termino logy, anthropologists, phi losophers, 
historians, and sociologists have developed a variety of responses that may be more su ited to this 
analysis. The first, regarding the semiotics of collective memory, is a means by which the 
concept of collective memory may be studied more empirically: by looking at signs and symbols 
of memory we find the organized ways people transmit what the larger society is asked to 
remember and forget (French 2012). As noted, this level of analys is is consistent with some 
assertions of Halbwacbs' theory. Later, I wi ll use the concepts of semiotic study to compare 
popular films and physical memorials of the American Wars in Korea and Vietnam. 
Another term has proven helpful in light of the ambiguity of the logic and terminology of 
collective memory: Jay Winter's collective remembrance over Halbwachs' collective memory 
(Halbwachs I 952; Winter 1999). To Winter, remembrance better captures the active component 
of crafting a memory. Rather than make assertions about unconscious psychological processes, 
remembrance reminds us that a significant component of an event's legacy has to do with the 
active steps taken to memorialize it, whether those be more obvious examples like memorials, 
movies, and history curricula or the less obv ious ones like the names we give wars, the way we 
talk about them, and even whether we talk about them at a ll. Indeed, those instances we don 't 
discuss will prove impot1ant in later moments of this ana lysis. 
A welcome concept from Pierre Bourdieu complicates discussions about how the U.S 
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remembers these wars: the dialectical habitus. As a dialectic, habitus provides a more dynamic 
definition ofthe individual and society. Habitus is also, quite deliberately, an innovative way to 
think about the past. Bourdieu explains hi s word choice, 
Why did I rev ive that old word? Because with the notion of habitus you can refer to something 
that is close to what is suggested by the idea of habit, while differing from it in one imp01tant 
respect. The habitus, as the word implies, is that wh ich one has acquired, but which has become 
durably incorporated in the body in the form of permanent dispositions. So the term constantly 
reminds us that it refers to something hi storical, linked to individual history, and that it belongs to 
a genetic mode of thought (Bourdieu 1984). 
Habitus, finally, accounts for the relationship between the individual , the soc iety, and the 
past that Halbwachs neglects to fully detai I. 
Lastly, Frederik Barth ' s studies on knowledge can also enrich our discussions of how 
cultures create their hi story. As he noted in an address to the Johns Hopkins Uni versity 
Department of Anthropology, his perception of knowledge is that ·'a knowledge that must have 
its we llsprings in individual experience yet becomes to large extent conventional in social circ les 
and in turn what the processes are whereby these conventional bodies of knowledge assume their 
locally characteristic shapes'' (Barth 2002, 2). Evoking Winter's "remembrance," Barth's 
knowledge, French's semiotics, and Bourdieu's habitus can protect against the risk of 
decontextualizing memory so much that "memory" has little to do with mental processes at all. 
In light of these thinkers, it may be appropriate to expand our gaze considerably and view 
the U.S's military engagements with Korea and Vietnam in other terms in addition to memory. 
To that end, I wi ll expand upon Bourdieu 's habitus to provide structure for the processes that 
occur to individuate these co llective experiences. Habitus is a sound theoretical work to move to 
a first example of war remembrance and mnemonics through Edna Lomsky-Fecler' s (2004) ideas 
of the distribution of trauma and experiences for the "dominant voice'' of a society as well as 
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those "other voices." 
Habitus 
Bourdieu's dialectical concept habitus explores how the past manifests in individuals in 
the present. Some of these concepts may resemble the sociall y-oriented work of th inkers like 
Durkheim and Halbwachs, but Bourdieu adds the concept ofthe multiple dialectics of the 
habitus. 
Habitus can be thought of how the world outside of the individual and the world inside of 
the individual shape one another. ln Bourdieu' s words, habitus is "a structural and structuring 
structure" : it is structural because it is built by events and experiences in the past; it is structuring 
because it shapes events in the future, and it is a structure because it incorpo rates some 
regulat ion and pattern ( 1984, 170-171 ). Bourdieu uses the word "dispositions" to reflect the 
generative aspects of habitus, framing past experiences as primers for how people interpret future 
experiences and formulate potenti al responses. The relationship between habitus and one's 
current circumstances is key. 
More relevant to the discussion of memory is Bourdieu's notion of habitus as "how we 
carry within us our history" and "how we bring our past into our present" (Grenfell 2008, 52.). 
These dimensions of the definition can soften the a ll-pervas ive power ofthe group and instead 
make the process of remembering a dynam ic one that takes place both w ithin and between 
society and citizens' minds. 
Habitus as a Dialectic 
What are the implications for using a dialectical approach rather than Halbwachs' 
approach? In Bourdieu's theory, habitus represents the cyclical and ever-changing relationship 
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between multiple factors: the past, present and future; the social and the individual; the objective 
and the subj ective; and structure and agency. Bourdieu, fo ll owing in a similar tradition to 
Halbwachs of integrating soc iology, anthropology, and ph ilosophy, invites us to transcend these 
dichotomies. In this theory, then, the nation is no longer reified into a be ing whose memories are 
housed in its citizens' minds, but the processes of remembrance bounce from individuals to 
society and back again . ·'Histories" are reformed in light of the individual, and the self is 
reformed in light of history and memory. 
Habitus as a Game 
Another way to think of habitus is in terms of a game, in that we learn it "as we go'' --we 
acq uire practical mastery and practical knowledge as we play the ga me. One way thi s practica l 
knowledge may manifest is in how the game's ''p layers'' are "permitted" to remember the past. 
Add itionally, to Bolll·dieu, "the view of the game from above is not the same as the view of 
partic ipants on the ground" (Grenfell 200, 55). If wars, from this understanding, can be v iewed 
as one v iews the games of habitus, veterans of war, power holders adm ini sterin g war, and 
nations in war learn different rules about remembering war. 
Memories ofand About Veterans 
This '·rule learning" is exemplified in the work of Edna Lomsky- Feder (2004), whi ch 
inv ites readers to recons ider the widely accepted real ities of war alongside the popular literature 
of war. She makes the provocative claim that scho larly work on war memories, particularly that 
on war veterans, evokes the gruesome and ruinous effects of war memories without 
acknowledging another dimension of the image so many of us associate with veterans. This is, in 
Lomsky-Fcder's words. "the image of the hero ic so ldier, accord ing to which war enables the 
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soldier to realize his mascu linity to the highest possible degree and to actualize supreme values 
ofhuman existence, such as personal sacrifice for the sake of the greater good" (2004, 84). How 
can these remembrances coexist? 
This key concept of Lomsky-Feder's analysis is relevant to the confusion and ambiguity 
assoc iated with the Korean and Vietnam Wars: a general dearth of literature recognizing the 
widely accepted mnemonic duality of war as noble and heartbreaking, as a growth experience 
and a force that hinders one's life course. Lomsky-Feder focused her research on Israeli veterans 
of the Yom Kippur War (6-25 October 1967). While the nation of Israel has un ique utilities of 
memory, much of Lomsky-Feder's analysis can be extrapo lated to the Korean and Vietnam 
Wars. She exp lains that though the Yom Kippur War was not as long, not as po li tically critical, 
and not as brutal as the 1948 War of Independence, "it was the Yom Kippur War that came to be 
defined social ly in terms of a collective trauma" (2004, 87). Lomsky-Feder notes "the confusion 
and uncertainty over what was happen ing at the front [of the Yom Kippur War]," and overall that 
"The Yom Kippur War ... shattered Israel's faith in the absolute power of the IDF [and] 
reawakened feelings of instability and insecurity" (2004, 87). Does this description not resemble 
a popular conception of the Vietnam War, as an era of intense insecurity and uncerta inty? 
Add itionally, Lomsky-Feder's application of the term '·generational memory" may be 
one vehicle to understanding some ofBourdieu's ru les ofthe habitus ofthcse wars. Lomsky 
found instances of generational memory in her interviews of a particul ar generation of veterans 
from the Yom Kippur War. Even if these men did not identify personall y with a memory or with 
a conception of the conflict, they were able to identi fy wider trends that were supposedly 
assoc iated with their generation. Lomsky-Fedcr's analysis details who among Yom Kippur War 
veterans is entit led to remember the war and identify with the trauma. Even among the priv ileged 
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class of veterans she interviewed there was a hierarchy based on experiences of the war. Those 
who fought in key battles (as understood by the popular historiography of the Yom Kippur War) 
were the "dominant voices" of the war, permitted to identify with the trauma and noted that the 
war altered the course of their life. In contrast, those who served in supporting roles were the 
"other voices" and did not consider themselves as '"really' in the war" and discounted the war's 
impact on the rest of their lives (2004, 94). 
The Yom Kippur War example provides a satisfying explanation of how individuals 
memorialize traumatic events. Memories are, at their base, personal experiences. The social field 
offers a number of interpretations of these experiences and the interpretations do not have equal 
chances to be chosen (Bourd ieu 1984). Additionally, Bourdieu and Lomsky-Feder assert that 
people learn their rightful place in the social world and subsequently, they learn how to play by 
the rules. Alongs ide the frameworks of sem iotics and remembrance, we may begin our own 
critical look into memorializing the Korean and Vietnam Wars. 
PART II: Memories of the American Wars in Korea and Vietnam 
As historian Bruce Cumings notes in the preeminent volume on the American military 
engagement in Korea, 
The Korean conflict was the occas ion for transform ing the Un ited States into a very different 
country than it had ever been before: one with hundreds of permanent military bases abroad , a 
large standing army, and a permanent national security state at home. American assume the 
Vietnam War is far more important" (20 I 0, 208). 
Of course, all military engagements are important. The goal of thi s paper is not to suggest 
Americans stop memorializing the Vietnam War. Our sympathy and concern needn't be such a 
finite resource; we can acknowledge that we disproportionately emphasize certa in historical 
events due to the perceived effect they had on our nation and the sentimental va lue of their 
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language and lessons. Most importantly, as citizens of a nation with troops all around the world, 
we ought to give the Korean War a moment of our time amidst the intense collective 
memorialization ofthe war in Vietnam. 
By incorporating the theoretical dimensions of remembrance/mnemonics, habitus, 
"dominant voices" and semiotics while granting that interpretations of events can be distributed 
to us by those in power, we are prepared to undertake two endeavors: the first is to craft a more 
holistic, anthropological account of these historical times and the second is to challenge why our 
leaders and ourselves choose to memorialize these conflicts in the way that we do. Perhaps then 
we can discover a more critical historical approach. 
Comparing Commemorations: The Forgotten War and the Unforgettable War 
Why compare the remembrance of the American military campaigns in Vietnam and 
Korea? First, there are key similarities between the two conflicts, such as U.S so ldiers 
encountering an unfamiliar kind of warfare in an unfamiliar part of the world . American troops 
also w ithdrew from both conflicts, and there were important markers of both conflicts on the 17th 
and 38th parallels. As Robert C. Cottrell notes in his volume of the series Arbitrary Borders, "in 
each instance, drawing an artificial border in no way ensured that further hosti liti es would be 
avoided' ' (2004, 2). These borders were decided by outside bodies and thus undoubtedly ran 
through communities and families. However, they were viewed by their creators as a necessary 
political precaution. From a strategic standpo int, both occurred in a larger context of the Cold 
War policy of containment. To summarize at a risk of oversimplification, both wars were 
instances of American in vo lvement in an East Asian nation sp lit into a communist North and a 
liberal-influenced South. It is beyond the scope of this project to detail the histories of these 
conflicts further. 
16 
There also exist important differences. The conflicts happened amidst distinctly different 
popular political attitudes, one of proud fatigue after a successful war campaign and one of soc ial 
unrest and protest. The American involvement in Korea was much shorter than in Vietnam, 
lasting three years compared to up to two decades in Vietnam. The Vietnam War ended 40 years 
ago, while the Korean War ended over two decades before that. Add itionally, American troops 
quickly departed from Vietnam when the war ended, wh ile there are still tens of thousands of 
so ldiers stationed in Korea. 
The time passed since each war provides a concrete starting point in comparing 
remembrances of each era. A study by Schuman and Scott entitl ed ·'Generations and Coll ective 
Memory" is revealing as to what historical events come up most frequently in popular discourse: 
'"The events and changes that have maximum impact in terms of memorableness occur during a 
cohort's adolescence and young adulthood" (Schuman and Scott 1989, 377). 'J'brougb these 
events an entire generation began forging their adu lt identity, reminiscent of a time when they 
first blinked their eyes and were violently thrust into an adu lt awareness in which their actions 
had a drastic consequence somewhere in the world. Those that watched the Vietnam War at age 
twenty are representatives of the massive baby boomer generation. These people not only make 
up a huge number of Americans, but hold many of the powerful positions in our society. Aga in , 
the argument that time is a determinant of difference between our perceptions of the wars wou ld 
be sound, and likely hold some truth. But, this project aims for a leve l deeper than the historical 
level , setting the hi storical context against some lived experiences of the wars, setting the proven 
history against the parts of wh ich people remind one another and of the parts governments 
emphas ize. 
17 
"Vietnam Was a War Not a Movie" 
(Bumper Sticker of a Vietnam Veteran in Sturken 2004, 96) 
It is difficult to forget Francis Ford Coppola's Apocalypse Now (or its literary 
predecessor Heart of Darkness). These works and others like Platoon, Full Metal Jacket, Forrest 
Gump, and Good Morning Vietnam give different impressions of life in war than WWII movies 
like Saving Private Ryan and The Longest Day. Movies about the Vietnam War, rather than 
evoking sentiments of battling a regime as formidable and obviously destructive as Nazi 
Germany, instead emphasize different elements of the of the Vietnam War experience. Call it 
progress or better filmmaking, but films about the war in Vietnam tend to emphasize 
purposelessness and ambiguity. Indeed, Francis Ford Coppola was deeply concerned with 
recreating these elements war experience. When he brought the film to the 1979 Cannes Film 
Festival , Coppola asserted, "my film is not about Vietnam . It is Vietnam. It's what it was really 
like. It was crazy .. . and little by little, we went insane" (Sturken 1997, 98). The distinctive 
meaninglessness and internal conflict of American soldiers in the War in Vietnam is also 
notoriously difficult to portray. As Marita Sturken asks, "does the problem ofrepresentability lie 
in the combat experience itself or rather in the Vietnam War's resistance to standard narratives of 
technology, masculinity, and US nationalism?" (1997, 87) . American films suggest that people 
view the Vietnam War as a first encounter with a war that challenged these "standard narratives," 
but, as Cumings reminds us, this first encounter actually occurred two decades earlier. 
Sturken explains, "in the cultural reenactment of the original drama, coherence and 
narrative structure emerge, and fragments of memory are made whole" (Sturken 1997, 85). 
Indeed , films can help give substance and shape to popular organizations of history. Recalling 
Lomsky-Feder's hierarchy of which veterans were permitted to remember the Yom Kippur War 
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as traumatic, Vietnam War films, with their emphasis on realism and representability, can 
embody the darkest uncertainties of this era. Or, perhaps, gather these ambiguities together and 
provide them with at least a narrative arc. In Brigette French's work The Semiotics of Collective 
Memory, the author utilizes the theory of Pierre Nora's "memory sites" to bring some tangibility 
to the study of collective memories/remembering. Nora's definition of a "memory sites" or lieux 
de memorie is "where memory crystallizes and secretes itself' (1989, 7). In French's analysis, 
these sites might include '·language, monuments, memorials, rural landscapes, urban environs, 
testimonies, and embodied performances" (2012, 340). American films about the War in 
Vietnam are indeed "embodied performances,'' but language, monuments, and memorials have 
not been insignificant. Think about the popular joke, "back in 'Nam" to reference a retrospective 
comment. Imagine the reception of a "back in Pyongyang" crack. Even in our humor, we outline 
and define the "important" moments of our history mnemonic. Addit ionally, The Vietnam 
Veterans Memorial, a two-acre structure, began construction within a decade of the war's end. In 
smooth black gabbro stone, visitors can view their reflection amongst the names of American 
casualties and supposedly bring the present and past together. These semiotics help to mold the 
habitus of"dominant voices" for the American War in Vietnam. These voices are those that 
express guilt, reflection, and confusion. 
The Korean War: The Forgotten War 
"l(s strange that we've never read of this in the newspapers. '' 
''.Well ... that 's newspapers.fbr you, ma'am. You could fill volumes with what you 
don 'i read in them. '' -- Coming Home, (Vietnam War film) 
As a contrast, the Korean Veterans Memorial was not built until 1995 and was only 
established after significant controversy. How could an important international conflict be 
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relegated to this status? At the time of the war, barely six years after World War II, it seemed to 
American statesmen that the nation faced another existential threat. Indeed, the civil war in 
Korea and its connection to Communist developments occupied the nation's attention for some 
time, but the memorialization of this military era is an entirely different story. 
In analysis of the war in Korea, an oft-repeated sentiment is how little the public felt they 
understood it. (Young 20 I 0, 131 ). In Young's analysis, the American public began forgetting 
about the Korean War even as it happened. George Lipsitz also offers analysis on how 
Americans interact with mass media, and how the capacities of mass media inform our 
memories. For Lipsitz, "the [invention and adoption of the] daily newspaper naturalized a kind of 
confusion in which the world seemed structu red by iso lated and d iscrete events" (20 11, 353). 
Indeed, one of the most unfamiliar kinds of war the nation had seen since its inception was 
disseminated through media that attempted to divide and stream line it each day. These bite-sized 
pieces of a large and ambiguous moment were also chances to convince the people of the 
urgency of the American cause. 
Today, bite-sized pieces of confusing events can be found in history books. The rare texts 
that do provide some amount of detail of The Korean War still focus more on the ideological 
threat of Communism than of destruction and confusion. Studies such as Lin et al. (2009) and 
Fleming and Kaufman (1990) detail the treatment of the Korean War in history textbooks. Of 
twelve textbooks that sufficiently represent the breadth of history books utilized in high school, 
only two provide casualty estimates for Korean or Chinese citizens (1990, pg. 37). 
Additionally, the American public was subjected to a successfu l public relations 
campaign surrounding the conflict. Coming off of World War II , Americans expressed a 
mix of sentiments: fatigue, frustration, and confusion that there was somehow still more 
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war to be fought, al l alongside a general trust in U.S. fore ign policy. But, as Young notes, 
"the film industry was ready fro m the first to help the government explain why it had to 
send the boys to Korea." In fact, Why Korea, a fi lm that cou ld undoubtedly be 
characterized as propaganda, won an Academy Award for best short documentary in 
1951 . Its key assertion? ''What we are dejimding is not geographic borders, but a ·way of 
!?(e. " (Academy of Motion Picture Arts and Sciences, n.d.; Young 120, 20 l 0). Beyond 
Why Korea and a few exceptions, however, there was not a significant audi ence for 
movies about the Korean War (Young 20 I 0, 122). 
It may seem li ke thi s conflict simply fe ll by the wayside of a nation with a 
bustling hi story of international engagement, but I wo uld urge readers to move beyond 
the obvious examples of forgotten histories; to move from, as Peter Burke describes, ''the 
official censorsh ip of embarrassing memories ... [to] ... investigation of their unofficial 
suppression or repression" (Burke 1990, 192). 
True, some component of this forgett ing can be exp la ined by casualty tolls and 
chronological distance from the conflicts. However, were casualty tolls or the passage of time the 
only factors, we may not remember the Cold War or the American Civ il War at a ll. l posit that 
there is more to the forgetting of the Korean War in relation to other confli cts, particularly the 
Vietnam War. 
Forgetting 
What does it mean to be " forgotten"? Philosophers such as Marc Auge (2004) and 
Tzvetan Todorov (200 I) carefu lly explicate how forgetting is not just an unconscious 
psychological process whose outcomes shape our understand ings of the past, but fo rgetting, 
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particu larly on an inst itut ional level , is both generative in allowing us to interpret and weigh the 
memories that do remain and is a key part of us forming our understanding of the past. 
Forgetting, then, can be as active as remembering. These th inkers' can put words to the grav ity 
of the Korean War as "the forgotten war." ·r hese conceptions of forgetting suggest that excluding 
the Korean War from the American narrative is in fact a positive and proactive component of 
American history. 
Wh ile the "dominant voices" tout the narrative of the Vietnam veteran struggl ing 
with fee lings of purposelessness, intense amb iguity in Korea happened decades ear lier. 
As anthropo logist Marilyn B. Young notes in " l iard Sell : The Korean War," '·the image 
of war perfected and perpetuated by combat report ing in WW II had encouraged 
Americans to bel ieve the ir wars were without ambigu ity, against regular troops on the 
ground and c learly marked enemy territory from the air" (20 I 0, 126) . Americans read 
about and watched the war in Korea from the framework they had learned during World 
War II. Though the War in Vietnam is commonly known as ·'the te levision war,'' this 
characterizat ion bears c larifi cation. The Korean War was a lso televised, but the American 
population did not own televi sions at the same rate as during the Korean War (Pach 20 I 0, 
172). A lternative ly the Vietnam War was "the ti rst time that TV coverage had a critica l 
effect on public understanding of a war effort and on a president's ab ility to sell war" 
(Pach 20 10, 172). 
Comparing Legacies of the Wars 
The amb iguity of both confl icts, sparked by the crossing of an ·'arbitrary border," 
embod ies the unfamiliarity that plagued the U.S military strategy in East As ia. (Cottre ll 2004). I 
w ill now briefly argue that the war in Korea has had a more significant international political 
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impact than the war in Vietnam. 
The international securi ty presence today's Americans know is not an ancient 
phenomenon, nonvas it intended by the nation's founding fathers . It was the Korean War era 
and Cold War containment po licy that solid ified America's status as. '·the pol icemen of the 
world" (Cumi ngs 2010, 243) . Hikes in mi litary defense spending were approved time and time 
again, and thus became normalized fu rther. The newly established military bases abroad, which 
did not ex ist at any signifi cant level until the Korean War, helped foster a booming military 
industri al complex and solidified the role of the military in everyday li fe for Americans 
(Cumings 20 l 0). For North Korea, what is perceived as invas ion and imperial ism by outsiders 
has crystallized in the form of a system of government that is, at its very core, anti- Western . As 
B.J. Meyers explains, American .. [Yankees] are a race with which Koreans must forever be on 
hosti le terms" (Meyers 20 I 0, 135). 
Alternatively, Vietnam stood more as a test run of these new political precedents and, as I 
will later argue, the language and experiences of war learned in the Korea confli ct. The U.S-
backed Republic of Vietnam, had onl y ex isted for two decades when the Democratic Republic of 
Vietnam succeeded in unifying the two countri es. Afterwards, through post-war reconstruction , a 
legacy of a return to the storied Vietnam of millen ia was cata lyzed. Today, the most obvious 
factors characterizing everyday life in urban parts of Vietnam are the forces of globa lization 
rather than those of any particularly American war origin . Whi le the war Vietnam may be more 
commonly evoked in popul ar rhetori c in the U.S. , I argue that this tendency can be att ributed to 
more sentimenta l reasons than actual impact. Because we have better semiotics upon which to 
latch, and because of a learned habitus of the popular Vietnam mnemonic, we memoriali ze it. 
Because veterans of the Korean conflict are perishing, because we lacked the same qua lity and 
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quantity of semiotics, and perhaps because we deliberately forgot the war that served as our first 
glaring example of a fail ed war, we do not memorialize the Korean War the same way. 
Conclusion 
I believe that the Ameri can habitus of mnemonics of these wars is one that privileges the 
American War in Vietnam and discounts the American War in Korea . Ged i and Elam cite 
Tolstoy's War and Peace , where in Rostov falsely represents his time on the front to fit the 
stereotype of a so ldier. 
"He [described]. .. bis Schon Grabe rn affair, just as those who have taken part in a battle generally 
do describe it, that is, as they would like it to have been, as they have heard it described by others, 
and as sounds well , but not at a ll as it rea lly was ... bes ides, to te ll everything as it reall y happened, 
it wo uld have been necessary to make an effort of will to tell only what happened'' (Tolstoy 1869). 
Rostov stretches th e truth because he sees that as the onl y way to reach hi s audience. As we 
repeat our semi otics and habituses for hi stories, we cod ify the protocol for talking about them. 
This protocol o f' 'domi nant vo ices" can be so pervasive that it enters into vete rans own retellings 
of war, such as those profiled by Marita Sturken. Noted William Adams, "what really happened 
is now so thoro ughl y mixed up in my mind with what has been said about what happened that 
the pure experience is no longer there" (Sturken 1997, 86). In dialogue w ith the past, we 
estab lish the accepted ways, the habitus, of feeling guilt. We shape the past and it shapes us 
back. Different eras of hi story and different casualty counts only te ll part of the story of the 
di ffere nce in memorializations between these two conflicts . I would like to posit that the war in 
Korea is unjust ly underrepresented in American mnemonics of important wars. From a habitus of 
"dom inant vo ices'' regarding these confli cts, the war in Vietnam "fits in" more easily with 
American history narratives and mnemoni cs. This is due to the technology and imagery 
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capabilities surrounding each conflict, the fact that Vietnam has a higher standard of li ving than 
the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, and the fact that experiences in Korea prov ided 
delayed knowledge, onl y allowing Americans to assess and provide language for the war 20 
years later. 
When Ameri cans think about the Vietnam War, we have the benefit of semiotics to 
provide the illustrations. Perhaps we think of the Memorial in Wash ington, or the infamous 
Walter Cronkite broadcast that risked turning the public against the war. The technological 
advances of the period between the wars, inc luding the increased telev ision consumption, bode 
well in our processing our gui lt about Vietnam. Our support and continued use of these 
semi otics, guided by sentimenta lity more than critical thinking, further engrains them in our 
habitus. 
In 20 17, perhaps it is easier to process guilt about the war in Vietnam than the war in 
Korea because Vietnamese citizens large ly mainta in a hi gher standard of li ving than those in 
North Korea. Beyond a corrupt government or a lack of freedom of speech, there is food security 
and economic opportuni ty for most Vietnamese. In past research surveying war survivors in 
Hanoi, many simply expressed gratitude that bombs are no longer being dropped. But Vietnam's 
comeback over the last few decades and the comfort of the retrospective pos ition allow us to 
eloquently critique our actions in Vietnam, while findin g so lace in the fact that many of us knew 
it was wrong at the time. Alternat ively, in Korea, we were inexperi enced on all fronts. During 
World War II , we had ass isted defeating the ex istential threat ofNazism. I am sure Ameri cans 
ca lcu lated that the defeat of Communi sm was therefore within reach. 
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Further Impacts 
I did not initially intend for this project to be so relevant to current international anxieties 
of the United States. The U.S. impact on the obstinate and foundational anti-Western philosophy 
of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea deserves a greater role in our national dialogue. 
Perhaps the grav ity of thi s correlation is one reason it seems difficult to discuss . Nietzsche 
suggested that "man ... braces himself against the great and ever greater pressure of what is past; it 
pushes him down and bends him sideways, it encumbers his steps as a dark, invisible burden" 
(2010, 73) . In our case, it threatens us with nuclear warfare. 
Where we stand today, Vietnam is a rapidly growing, rap idly urbanizing nation (The 
World Bank 2011). While rates of poverty differ among different geographic regions and ethnic 
groups, the overall rate of poverty is decreasing rap idl y and access to basic services continues to 
improve (The World Bank 20 ll , 53-54 & 208). Life is not perfect in Vietnam, and Vietnamese 
do not forget the acts com mitted by the U.S--indeed, the American War in Vietnam is large ly 
regarded as an ill ega l war of aggression--but the Vietnamese are certainl y enjoying a higher 
standard of li ving than they had in the years immed iate ly following the (Quan 20 14). While 
Vietnam lacks approval in the measures lauded by the Freedom House as necessary for a free 
nation (freedom of the press and internet freedom), the Vietnamese enj oy an acceptable standard 
of li ving (Freedom House n.d). 
South Korea is "widely regarded as having joined the developed world" (fnvestopedia 
20 l6). Indicators like life expectancy and access to education are high. What we know of North 
Korea, by contrast, is that it holds an ·'alarming" measure for its Global Hunger index, anaem ia 
rates are a public hea lth problem, and its press is certain ly not free (Freedom House n.d. ,World 
Health Organization n.d. , Demick 2009, 289). 
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This is to say nothing of the nations where the actions of the United States had di sastrous 
consequences that manifest themselves in political costs as we ll as in blood . There are many eras 
in America's past that have been forgotten. These eras, Under Auge (2004) and Todorov's 
(200 1) analysis, may provide suitable topics for further analysis on forgetting. 
On Memory 
If what's miss ing from the acts of collective remembrance in the U.S is the recognition of 
the biases inherent in our hi stories and commemoration, how might we reframe our cu ltural 
remembering in order to capture the impacts of our act ions better? How can we be thoughtful 
about what we choose to memorialize, to give weight to not just those hi storic events that strike a 
particu lar chord of gu i It or horror, or memoria I ize a particul ar period of nostalgia, but those that 
set off chains of events that define some of the bleakest realities in our world today? 
One way wou ld be to spend some time sh ift ing perspectives in our studies of hi story. By 
that I mean including in our remembering those memories that are based outside of the 
establ ished national narrative or the co llective remembrance. As hi storian Peter Burke notes, 
given the multip licity of social identities, and the coexistence of ri va l memories, alternat ive 
memori es (fam il y memori es, local memori es, class memories, national memori es, and so on), it is 
surely more fruitfu l to think in plu ra listi c terms abo ut the uses of memo ri es to different soc ial 
groups, who may we ll have different views about what is signifi cant or "worthy of memory.'' 
(Burke 1991 , 19 1). 
We can also consider looki ng at innovative branches of familiar di sciplines, such as 
focusing on \vhat Egyptologist Jan Assmann cal ls "mnemoh istory," the study of '·the past as it is 
remembered." The goal of such a disc ipLine is to "analyz[e] the mythical clements in trad ition 
and discover[sic] their hidden agenda" (Assmann 20 I I, 2 1 0). 
Lastl y. Michel Foucault 's notion of archaeo logy may prove fruitful. Foucau lt's 
reimagining of hi stori cal methodology proceeds under the following cond itions: 
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archaeo logy tri es to defin e not the th oughts, representat ions, but the themes, preoccupations that 
are revealed in discourse .. . archaeo logy does not try to restore what has been thought, wished, 
aimed at, experi enced, des ired by men in the very moment at which they expressed it in di scourse . 
(1972, 139) 
These a ltern ative ways to view the past comprise a few among many poss ibilities. If we 
can change the way we shape and understand history, particularly those bloody episodes fought 
for the most convo luted of reasons, perhaps we can reshape our habitus and prov ide future 
decision makers with more holistic inform ati on. 
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